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DOBB'S MODEL OF FEUDALISM
The crucial theoretical influence on Hilton and most other British Communist historians formed during the 1940s and 1950s came from Maurice Dobb's Studies in the development of capitalism, first published in 1946, which proposed a model of the feudal mode of production that became the theoretical benchmark for all subsequent debates over the transition from feudalism to capitalism. Dobb followed Marx's Capital in explaining England's 'truly revolutionary path' to capitalism through class struggle-the 'prime mover'-and class differentiation in terms of property rights to land, and defined the historical and theoretical problems with which Hilton grappled throughout his life as a historian. 3 Marx's theory of history rests on three pillars: a theory of class determination and class struggle; a theory of technological development; and a theory of the state, which-since the state requires a surplus to operate effectively-must include a political economy of markets. 4 However, for complex political and historiographical reasons that cannot be explored here, Dobb based his model on class struggle alone. This gave rise to two serious weaknesses in his and his followers' approach to the transition from feudalism to capitalism.
First, Dobb's model was devised in essence to explain the transition to capitalism, that is, to explain why the feudal mode of production was destined to fail in a 'general crisis' vaguely dated between the fourteenth and the seventeenth century. 5 Dobb argued that this failure was caused by systemic disincentives to capital accumulation and innovation, including peasant over-exploitation; but he did not have a convincing explanation for why the feudal mode of production had been capable of expanding, territorially, economically and technologically, for more than half a millennium before the crisis. The absence of a positive theory of development-which is a central feature of the Marxist theory of history and which must, ultimately, be mediated by some kind of scarcity-based transactions-probably also expressed the 'anti-market bias' that coloured Dobb's views of socialist planned economies when he wrote the Studies in the 1930s and 1940s. At that time, as he subsequently recalled, he underestimated 'the role of prices and economic incentives' in socialist economies, and his view of the feudal economy was clearly analogous. 6 That bias, and the subordination of positive incentives and markets in Dobb's scheme were reinforced by his subsequent debate with the American Marxist economist Paul Sweezy, a debate that made canonical the misleading theoretical alternative among Marxists between long-distance trade as an exogenous, independent cause of change, or 'prime mover', and petty commodity production as an endogenous source of historical evolution. 7 The second weakness of Dobb's model was its overwhelming focus on English history. There were good reasons for this, including the paradigmatic nature of England in Marx's narrative of the transition to capitalism and the state of historical research at the time Dobb wrote. But the restriction of the transition debate to English history helped to mask the difficulties that a strictly class-based analysis faced regarding the Marxian problematic of uneven development. Two questions need to be posed here. First, why did the transition to capitalism occur first in western Europe, even though parts of Asia were previously economically more advanced? And, second, why was the English economy between 1400 and 1700 able first to catch up with, and then to forge ahead of, previously more advanced Continental European regions? Paradoxically, Dobb's Studies offered a convincing demonstration that a purely class-based analysis could not supply a satisfactory explanation for why the European feudal mode of production was superior to its rivals, and why, despite this, it did not develop at the same rate and in the same direction. To answer comparative historical questions of this kind, it would be necessary to introduce the two pillars of Marxian analysis that were missing from Dobb's (and later Hilton's) account: a theory of technological development and a political economy of states and markets.
CLASS STRUGGLE AND OTHER 'PRIME MOVERS'
Class struggle and self-determination through struggle were central to Hilton's Marxism, as reflected in at least two books and in the title to his collected essays. 8 His documentation of rural struggle and resistance against landlord exploitation was crucial in establishing feudalism not as a stable and static social order, but as one of contradiction, conflict and movement, and is still outstandingly important. There were two purposes in Hilton's wish to document class conflict so thoroughly. On the one hand, Hilton expressed the long-standing concern among British left-wing and non-conformist historians with the self-knowledge and self-determination of the workers, the poor and the dispossessed-with history from the bottom up. 9 This tradition of labour history and communist populism was strongly upheld by Dona Torr, an abiding influence on the Communist Historians' Group, who helped direct the members' intellectual concerns towards 'the long history of popular democracy in England, and particularly the importance of the period in which small commodity producers were losing control of the means of production'. 10 On the other hand, Hilton followed Dobb's contention that the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Britain was the outcome of the persistent struggle over rents between landlords and peasants. Struggle over rent caused the self-sufficient peasantry to be ejected from the land during the later middle ages, and benefited a group of wealthy peasants (the future rural yeomanry) that increasingly produced for the market and specialised in saleable commodities. The change generated a large population of dependent wage earners who had to buy most of their requirements on the market. Ultimately, class struggle gave rise to agrarian capitalism and competitive, capitalist markets of sellers and buyers: class struggle 'explained' the transition to industrial capitalism. 11 As with Dobb, Hilton's interest in the development of the material forces of production-that is, in technological progress-was by contrast negligible. The association 4 of technological determinism with the more rigid versions of Stalinist 'scientific history' would have given technological explanations a bad press from early on in his life as a committed historian. 12 15 However, he did not consider technological stagnation to be an exogenous feature of the society and economy as did Postan, but followed Marx in making technical change endogenous to the relations of production. An essay written in 1962, published in 1965 and reprinted in 1973, on capital formation under feudalism, concluded from a set of complex calculations that landlord investment net of capital replacement was 5 per cent, which Hilton considered insufficient to support thirteenthcentury productivity. Rather than invest, their social and political standing impelled lords to spend most income on personal display, on the maintenance of a numerous retinue, and on war. Conversely, the burden of feudal rent (including feudal exactions, ecclesiastical tithes, arbitrary royal purveyancing, and growing state taxation) and land fragmentation deprived peasants of the necessary investment in capital stock. 16 Whereas that early essay had emphasized supply-side constraints on technological progress, Hilton increasingly identified behavioural, demand-side features as the most serious constraint. The following quotation, from an essay on agriculture in medieval Leicestershire, is typical of work before the 1970s that minimized the impact of medieval markets:
Medieval agriculture (…) was much more primitive and more uniform in character than it is today. The principal reason for variety in modern times is the development of production for the market; and the search in a capitalist society for the most profitable type of agricultural production has enhanced the importance of physical variations. In medieval agriculture, however, the market did not determine the character of production. The sustenance of the farmer and his family was the main objective. Even the urban demand was unspecialized, and hence there was comparatively little specialization in production. Everyone had to produce (on the whole) the same type of grain crop and tend the same sort of domesticated animals for meat, wool, and pulling power. Variations in the quality of land are therefore rarely referred to in medieval documents. 17 Having early on excluded technology and markets as dynamic historical forces, and in response possibly to Postan's Ricardo-Malthusian model, Hilton came subsequently to identify the effects on class struggle of the ratio between land and population as the principal source of economic change. 18 By contrast with his analysis of technology, however, this shift in emphasis was not accompanied by a theory of endogenous demographic growth. 19 
DOBB AGAIN: FROM CLASS STRUGGLE TO 'PETTY COMMODITY PRODUCTION'
Hilton's analysis of feudalism and of the feudal mode of production displays two phases separated by a theoretical watershed during the first half of the 1970s. His earlier approach had been strongly structural, centring on issues of class. Accordingly he did not engage directly with the 'late medieval crisis', although his regional 'histoire totale' of 1967 ended just before the crisis and promised to tackle the issue at a future date. 20 Hilton took up the challenge in the Ford Lectures of 1973, which also signalled an important although initially surreptitious change in emphasis. The lectures defined their central issue as follows: 'A question of particular importance, which some historians may think has been solved-though I do not-was whether the peasants' economy was significantly market-oriented. This is a problem of central importance for the investigation of all peasantries, medieval or not', since it affects the development of small-scale production for markets, of a competitive labour market, of internal stratification, and of capital accumulation. 21 Hilton's statement had two subtexts, both addressed critically to Postan. These were, firstly, Postan's adoption of A.V. Chayanov's model of the 'homeostatic' peasant economy whose wealth was determined by its cyclical demographic needs, in counterpoise to V. I. Lenin's model of social differentiation among the peasantry; 22 secondly, Postan's claimbased on the assumption, which Hilton had also previously accepted, that medieval peasants preferred economic self-reliance to trade-that the late medieval economy had contracted because peasants, faced with a collapse in population and thus of demand for land, had retreated into 'non-market' subsistence. Hilton's conclusion that 'all the evidence [from the late medieval west Midlands] suggests that the village economy based on the peasant households was considerably monetised' summed up both criticisms. 23 Even so, the Ford Lectures' characterization of the late middle ages was still strikingly static. Much occurred, yet the differences between the late thirteenth and the late fifteenth centuries were unclear, and they did not add up to the epochal watershed so central to his and pressure for the transfer of surplus. In fact, this must be regarded as a critical turning point in the history of the 'prime mover'. The long period of the successful and multiform exploitation of peasant labour ended, at any rate in most Western European countries, between the middle and the end of the fourteenth century. Only with the successful re-imposition of forms of legally enforceable serfdom could the landowners have continued their previous success. In the West this was politically and legally impossible. In Eastern Europe the story was different. In the West more and more of the disposable surplus was retained within the peasant economy. When the harsh yoke of landlordism was next felt by the rural population, it was something quite different in essence, if not always in form-the beginning of the emergence and long and uneven development of a new triad, landowner-capitalist farmer-farm labourer. 25
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
A more definite inclusion of demand among the determining factors of late medieval social and economic change was followed by a similar move with respect to legal and political institutions. For many years Hilton had been equally dismissive of feudal political structure and of the feudal state as of technological progress. His regional studies tended to take political structures and institutions for granted and focussed on mechanisms of rural exploitation. This was just as evident in his first study of Leicestershire estates as in his histoire totale of the west Midlands a quarter of a century later, which argued that history from the bottom up could mostly dispense with national politics and central government. 26 Although Hilton had shown an early concern with the dialectics of jurisdictional and political privileges or 'liberties', he made little effort to integrate his reflections into his mainstream research before the 1980s. The first proof of interest seems to be a pamphlet on Communism and Liberty published in 1950 for working-class readers, which defined feudal 'liberties' as 'a very concrete expression of class privileges' that nonetheless in the period of feudal expansion … were a means by which … the inherent tendencies towards anarchy were controlled. But as the productive forces from which capitalism was to develop expanded, these local, cellular forms of the political, social and economic organization of the feudal nobility became a restrictive force. Local feudal liberties had to be smashed. 27 Several years later, perhaps influenced by the more eclectic work of Perry Anderson, whose administrative and even jurisdictional autonomy'. 29 His subsequent comparison between English and French towns took the argument a step further, identifying jurisdictional privilege as a key element of both the medieval urban economy and its class structure:
Early medieval [English] urban communities, or rather the merchants which spoke for them, asked for the privileges which would give them freedom for mercantile activity.
These privileges were very much the same in the French communes. In the villes de franchise and the villes de consulat as well as in the English free boroughs the urban bourgeoisie had specific class interests in the achievement of privileges, which not only enabled it to control its mercantile activities, but also to subordinate the artisans, to organize municipal finance, and to use the crucial instrument of power in feudal society, jurisdiction, over the town's inhabitants. 30 Remarkably, this, Hilton's last major monograph, was framed in predominantly legal and institutional terms. Despite local variations, he suggested, English and French urban privileges displayed 'considerable similarities' defined as follows: 1. burgesses had personal legal security against arbitrary feudal jurisdiction; 2. urban courts applied simplified legal processes; 3. tenure of urban real property was free; 4. burgesses were exempt from seignieurial impositions; 5.
property was secured against arbitrary seizure; 6. towns had varying degrees of financial autonomy, usually granting townsmen the right to collect various dues; 7. towns had varying degrees of political and administrative autonomy.
Hilton concurrently identified several connections leading from political and institutional structure to diverging economic features in the two countries. 31 Yet, in common with other British Marxist historians of his generation, he never seriously engaged with twentieth-century Marxist theories of class and state-formation, whose main originators (Antonio Gramsci, György Lukacs and, later, Louis Althusser) were still mostly unknown in Britain before the early 1970s. To place this caveat in context, it is worth recalling that not one member of the first three generations of the 'Annales', including Marc Bloch, developed a significant interest in, let alone a theory of, the feudal or premodern state either.
THE COMPARATIVE METHOD
For much of his life Hilton seems to have viewed the comparative method as a source of generalizations about a social form, feudalism, which displayed roughly similar features across the whole of Europe. His focus on class determination and class relations led him to emphasize national and international similarities in the form and manner of peasant exploitation, rather than dissimilarities and divergences in the 'intricate machinery of class domination' and in economic development. 32 Like most Marxists of his generation, Hilton did not use comparison systematically as a heuristic tool that offers the historian the closest she can hope to get to controlled, testable hypotheses. Hilton did not ignore the latter entirely, but he tended to frame comparative questions in terms of English exceptionalism rather than as a guide to causation. Thus, his early paper on feudal capital formation suggested that, since 'one of the most important ways in which the late medieval peasants contributed to capital formation was in the building up of the country's herds of cattle and flocks of sheep', 'relatively tranquil countries like [late medieval] England' might have obtained 'a vital advantage in the early stages of the economic expansion of modern times' over Continental countries more damaged by warfare. 33 Subsequently, Hilton argued that the late medieval reduction in the feudal levy was most pronounced in England, 'the weak link of European feudalism', which 'no doubt
[explained] the primacy of England in capitalist development'. 34 A lack of interest in comparative heuristics helps explain why, having spent so much suggested, included the availability of land, which influenced the ability by poor and/or dispossessed peasants to migrate from areas of high population pressure, thereby reducing the need to find wage-employment; the form that feudal exactions took, which affected the strength of peasant resistance; and the presence of markets 'as represented by towns or interregional trade routes' and 'as encouraging commodity production (i.e. production for the market) within the petty mode', which stimulated processes of social differentiation. 36 Thus, inasmuch as class struggle over resources is mediated by political structure, and markets require political enforcement and co-ordination, Dobb's theory of development and underdevelopment presupposed a theory of the European feudal state and of its differences and divergences, which doesn't seem to have engaged Hilton's interest very much.
HILTON AND THE 'TRANSITION FROM FEUDALISM TO CAPITALISM': WHERE DO WE GO FROM

THERE?
Outside the Marxist canon, medieval social and economic historians for the past few decades 13 have followed many of the paths first outlined by Rodney Hilton, although not always on his terms. For historians with Marxist sympathies or a more theoretical inclination, Rodney Hilton established over four decades and nearly single-handedly a stronger empirical grounding to Dobb's theory of the transition from feudalism to capitalism, and defined many of the debate's parameters up to the present day.
For much of his life, Hilton focussed disproportionately on class and property rights to land, arguing that the dispossession of economically self-sufficient peasants from the land was both a necessary and a sufficient cause for the rise of a technologically dynamic, fully commoditized, capitalist mode of production. He was never greatly interested in the material forces of production (technological development), and came only late to questions related to the nature and dynamic of feudal power and the feudal state. These biases arguably weakened the import of his discovery in the 1970s of 'petty commodity production' as a source of dynamic change, and undermined his explanations for three basic phenomena, the internal dynamic (the prime mover) of the feudal economy, the transition to capitalism, and uneven development. The following notes take as their point of departure Dobb's and Hilton's work on these topics and the debates they gave rise to, to outline briefly my understanding of the current theoretical and empirical status quaestionis.
A theory of the feudal mode of production and of the transition to capitalism requires a clear definition of the historical beginning and end points of the process. I would define feudalism as a social-economic formation featuring a prevalence of:
1. divided and competing property rights to land, capital and labour, enforced by competing legal rights (from this follows that the military and economic competition between feudal lords gives rise to pressures for territorial political and institutional coordination, and establishes the parameters for state powers; note that serfdom is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a feudal society to emerge and persist); Agriculture and the feudal state. 37 A recent, substantial body of research shows that agricultural supply in medieval and early modern-that is, feudal-Europe was far more elastic than either Marxists like Hilton or 'Ricardo-Malthusian' pessimists like Postan assumed. 38 This work has established that the major bottleneck to productivity gains in feudal agriculture was not technological, as Postan claimed, for the best technology available to thirteenth-century agriculturalists was more than adequate to supply food to a growing population; land (and possibly labour) productivity in parts of early fourteenth-century England appear to have been as high as in the mid-to late eighteenth century. 39 The most notable feature of feudal agriculture was, by contrast, the astonishing inefficiency with which best practice was applied. Most feudal agriculture lay very far indeed from the contemporary technological frontier. However, the relative 'distance' from the frontier differed considerably between regions with similar institutions and property rights to land. How can these differences be explained? Why did some peasants-and lords-under feudalism apply best available practice, while their neighbours seemingly ignored the improved livelihoods they could achieve from technical innovation?
We saw that initially Dobb, Hilton and their followers explained these differences as a result of feudal property rights to land, and that in their eyes, only the introduction of capitalist relations to land epitomized by the 'landlord-tenant-labourer' triad could provide adequate incentives for systematic innovation. Their model thus predicted that lords and peasants under feudalism would behave similarly, and it excluded practically by definition the differentiating effect of market incentives. Dobb's and Hilton's 'discovery' in the 1960s and 1970s of the dynamic role of production for exchange did not essentially modify this anti-market bias, because they did not associate it with a political economy and an evolutionary theory of feudal markets. This made it impossible for them to explain why market incentives, and the agricultural innovation that markets stimulate, might differ between regions, or why incentives might change over time. That is also why Hilton could not convincingly explain why English peasants appeared to become more commercialised after the Black Death, since nothing in the way markets were organized seemed (in his analysis) to have changed.
Recent agrarian studies have placed far greater emphasis on 'commercialization', and explain differences in agrarian economic performance in terms of a broad range of factors that helped to determine the opportunity costs of investment (real rates of interest) and trade (transaction costs). Since real interest rates are, in the long run, a function of investment risk and investment opportunity (market size), both of which are determined by search, enforcement and transport costs, these studies suggest that the major cause of poor rates of investment and innovation arose from unusually high transaction costs under feudalism. In this view, feudal political and jurisdictional fragmentation and warfare gave rise to coordination failures and a systematic paucity of investment in public goods, including transport and commercial arrangements, credible and predictable justice, and financial and political stability.
This explanatory shift has two important implications. First, it turns agricultural supply from an independent variable that determined the overall rate of growth and opportunities for development of the feudal economy, into a dependent variable that could respond elastically to changes in demand, subject to the opportunity costs of investment and trade. Second, it shifts the emphasis in explanations of agricultural productivity from property rights to land narrowly defined, to property rights over the producer surplus broadly defined.
It suggests that students of the transition from feudalism to capitalism need to pay more attention to the conditions that made investment in agriculture profitable, rather than to the technical or organizational characteristics of feudal agriculture itself.
These findings with respect to agriculture can be reformulated along Marxist lines as follows. In the feudal-tributary mode of production, most rural producers owned their means of production and sold a portion of their produce on the market. 40 They were therefore responsive to changes in supply and demand and relative prices for their surplus. 41 Feudal lords (who included the ruling elites in towns with jurisdictional prerogatives over the hinterland) extracted an agricultural surplus from the peasantry through decentralized legal compulsion backed by military threat; the surplus was perceived directly as rent in cash, kind or labour, and indirectly through taxation, levies on trade and the provision of justice.
Although the relative share of income from different sources varied over time and space, the share from rights of jurisdiction (which sometimes also included compulsory labour services) was always substantial. The principal threat to feudalism thus did not come from trade; up to a point feudalism thrived on trade. 42 However, feudal lords regulated and taxed markets for income. Moreover, because feudal lords as a class were less directly exposed to market pressures than peasant producers-at the end of the thirteenth century produce from the demesne sector in England, then the largest in western Europe, accounted for about 30 per cent of the average lordly income, equivalent to under 5 per cent of GNP, much of which would have been consumed directly-they were probably less likely to take the lead in agricultural innovation. 43 The main obstacle to agricultural growth in the feudal economy was thus the cost of trade, which was defined in the main by institutional regulation and tariffs and by political and military stability, and to a lesser extent by developments in transport technology. The lords' and towns' main purpose in stimulating trade was to maximize rent streams from their jurisdictional rights. Those rights were a basic feature of their social and political power. The introduction of jurisdictionally 'free' trade therefore did not just reduce feudal and urban revenue, but also challenged the superiority of lord over peasant and town over country. Yet, in the longer run, strong feudal and urban jurisdiction was incompatible with agrarian development: by the later Middle Ages, agricultural innovation was inversely correlated with the intensity of seignieurial rights, and rural proto-industrial growth was inversely correlated with the jurisdictional powers of towns. Thus, at the heart of feudalism lay the following major 'contradiction': the political economy of feudalism was necessary to establish markets and to coordinate economic activities during its first great phase of expansion (c.950-1250), but already by 1300 that same political economy-a combination of market monopolies and the coordination failures arising from political and jurisdictional parcellization-had transformed into fetters on further growth. By 1300, the fundamental constraint on feudal agriculture came from feudal institutional constraints, rather than from technological inertia.
Beneath these dominant features, the political economy of feudal Europe was significantly diversified. This diversity explains the emergence under feudalism no later than the early twelfth century of economically leading, or core, regions and semi-or fully peripheral ones. 44 In most of Western Europe, the use of lordly powers of coercion to tax and monopolize trade, which kept the feudal economy substantially below its full agricultural potential, was counterbalanced by feudal lords' strategy of territorial expansion through localized war. Warfare was as much a part of the intrinsic mechanics of feudalism as jurisdictional exploitation. Although the main goal of feudal territorial expansion was to broaden the lord's political and economic resources, expansion also generated wider benefits through increased jurisdictional integration and lower transaction costs within the new territory. State formation made it easier to modify property rights and introduce new institutions: it lowered seignieurial dues, abolished or seriously weakened rival feudal and urban monopolies, systematized legal codes and legislation, weights and measures, helped coordinate markets and reduced opportunities for pillage and warfare, and restricted rulers' opportunities to act as autocratic 'stationary bandits' against their subjects. 45 Political centralization-the transfer of sovereignty over feudal means of coercion from subordinate lords to superior territorial authorities-transformed feudal rights of jurisdiction that sanctioned a decentralized mode of coercion, into fiscal or property rights over commercial transactions that sanctioned a centralized, state-based mode of coercion.
Following the late medieval crisis, the evolution of decentralized feudal immunities into statedefined and redeemable claims to fiscal rights slowly turned the economic and legal base of the feudal class into commodities. Financial capital rather than social status gradually became the elites' new coin of exchange, while the state's decision whether to sell income streams to the highest bidder or to abolish them altogether became increasingly subject to financial and fiscal rather than political considerations. Thus, early modern 'absolutism' was not simply a form of state feudalism. By embarking on the road to centralized, monopolistic jurisdiction, early modern states also laid the institutional bases of modern capitalism and capitalist class struggle.
In sum, agricultural expansion in the feudal system was the outcome of two countervailing forces, the one pressing for military and jurisdictional decentralization, which made trade and investment more costly, the other pushing for increased political and jurisdictional centralization, which reduced the costs of investment and trade. In the long run, the latter won out, lowering transaction costs and stimulating commercialization and specialization. The 'prime mover' and the 'contradiction' within the feudal mode of production lay in the relations between lords, peasants, markets and the state.
Expanding the wage-earning, non-agricultural sector. 46 The existence during the later middle ages of regions with extensive, potentially capitalistic, property rights to land (bourgeois ownership, competitive tenancies, easy availability of rural wage labour) such as Lombardy, Sicily, the Île de France, or parts of Flanders, which nonetheless did not experience a rapid capitalist transition, indicates that such property rights were perhaps necessary but were not sufficient for the transition to unfold. Rather than unique property to land, the most distinctive feature of the English economy compared to its Continental peers was the unusual elasticity of demand for surplus agricultural labour in the non-agricultural sectors. In England as elsewhere, excess agricultural labour was absorbed either by towns or by proto-industrial activities in the countryside. Since rural proto-industry tended to threaten traditional urban occupations and the urban tax base, town rulers generally opposed it; therefore, successful rural proto-industries required some form of institutionalized freedom from urban prerogatives over the countryside. The extent to which such necessary 'freedoms' could be gained determined the countryside's capacity to release excess agricultural labour and to absorb it into the industrial and service sectors, without initially displacing peasants physically into towns. Conversely, the development of a class of wage labourers that was no longer tied to its means of production undermined feudal coercion because it could credibly threaten to migrate. Although the capacity by established towns to oppose proto-industrial growth differed greatly across Europe, it tended to be strongest in the ancient, more Technological innovation. 47 Technological innovation in agriculture was far slower than in the rest of the economy. The reasons included the lack of botanical science that made it hard to transfer agricultural knowledge over long distances, and the unpredictability of agricultural markets discussed previously, which raised the opportunity cost of new techniques. But agricultural innovation in the sense of technical novelty (invention as opposed to diffusion) was scarce also because so much more could still be achieved with already available techniques: in eighteenth-century France, for example, existing technology could have generated a 60 per cent higher output than was achieved in practice. 48 As it is, without any persistent technological progress in manufacturing, mining and the production of energy, the transition to industrial capitalism could not have occurred, and the economy of feudal Europe would have got stuck in the kind of 'high level equilibrium trap' that characterized China into the eighteenth century. 49 To understand why feudal Europe was able to catch up with and forge ahead of its 'non-Western' peers, one needs to take a closer look at the kind of technical knowledge that premodern craftsmen and engineers operated with. Most importantly, the fact that such knowledge was largely tacit and experience-based set basic cognitive limitations to how it could be expressed, processed and transmitted. Lack of codification meant that information about what was available, and the reproduction of that knowledge, depended significantly on the mobility of individual experts.
Arguably the essential reason why technical innovation under feudalism was so slow lay with the high costs of transferring experience-based, uncodified knowledge, and in the weak and irregular face-to-face interactions between geographically dispersed craftsmen and engineers.
From the late eleventh century, however, a distinctively 'feudal' technological system began to emerge, based on craft-based apprenticeship training, non-ascriptive membership of craft associations and, increasingly, competition for skilled workers between individual towns and states. These three elements were greatly strengthened during the late medieval crisis, and sustained a sharp, secular increase in the rate of technical innovation and diffusion across western Europe, for they defined a set of necessary and sufficient endogenous conditions for the accumulation, codification and circulation of reliable technical knowledge. Craft-based training ensured that it met both masters' and apprentices' needs. Non-ascriptive membership meant that skilled workers could move from city to city without restriction or penalty. And inter-state competition for technology and high-status consumer goods meant that specialized knowledge could circulate and cross-fertilize, and that technicians could move where their skills were most required.
The costs of technical dissemination fell over time in response to growing state competition for skilled workers, and to urbanization. Urbanization-especially the development of regional and national metropolises after the late medieval crisis-offered improved opportunities for exchanging knowledge, higher average quality of labour, a greater likelihood of matching skills to demand, and stronger incentives for knowledge modelling and codification. Although it is not a priori clear whether high urbanization attracted skilled migrants, or whether migration (driven by exogenous factors like war) caused high urbanization, the evidence points to the primacy of the former, pull factors, specifically of urban commercial success. Skilled migrants enabled each new technological leader-which shifted over time from central and northern Italy (1200-1450), to the southern Rhineland and southern Netherlands (c.1450-1570), to the Dutch Republic (1570-1675) and finally to Britain after c. 1675-to draw on the accumulated knowledge of its predecessors, recombine it with local experience, and develop the knowledge pool further. Nonetheless, the secular rate of innovation was not stable; it seems to have experienced two marked increases during the late medieval and the seventeenth-century crises, when coordination within states and competition between states increased sharply. The underlying, unifying factor of the two great 'feudal crises' of the Marxist canon is thus the rate of development of the productive forces. character of medieval Leicestershire agriculture, it nevertheless contained important sectors which were producing for the market-sectors no doubt of qualitative rather than of quantitative significance' (my emphasis). 18 In 'Feudalism in Europe', Hilton included population among the determinant forces of production under feudalism, inasmuch as demographic collapse in the fourteenth century allowed the emergence of a yeoman class that gave rise in turn to the English agricultural revolution. He claimed on these grounds that causal primacy in social development could switch over time between class struggle and the forces of production. 19 Such a theory was attempted for late medieval Normandy by G. Bois, Crise du féodalisme
